Wally Hammond
by Bassano Ltd; half-plate glass negative, 10 September 1936
NPG x21815 © National Portrait Gallery, London
If Wally Hammond is universally regarded as a good batter, there is similar — albeit less complimentary — agreement about his captaincy. His overall record as a Test captain is poor: he led England 20 times, winning four games, losing three and drawing the rest. Worse than his record were the judgements against his leadership. Many journalists and many of those who played under him were scathing in their opinions. Yet a distinction should be made here. Hammond led England in three series before the Second World War and three after it. And it was the 1946–47 Ashes series which forced the conclusion that he was a poor captain. However, perhaps it is unfair to base judgement on a series when Hammond was mentally, physically and emotionally worn out, and he had a much better record (and reputation) as captain before the war. Perhaps his biggest achievement was to have led at all. He was the first professional cricketer to be captain England, although to do so he had to shed his professional status in a way which reflected poorly on Hammond and the system from which he emerged.
Hammond’s appointment as England captain was somewhat manufactured. Precedent, convention and outright discrimination meant that in this period, captaincy always went to amateurs. Although many arguments were trotted out to support such a position, the real reason was simple snobbery — the assumption that amateurs, who were almost always from the middle or upper-middle classes at this time, were superior to working-class professionals. Even at the time, many viewed such an attitude as outdated and there was growing opposition to the whole idea of amateurism. County captains were also generally amateurs, although there had been an abortive attempt to appoint Herbert Sutcliffe as Yorkshire captain (initially the plan was to have him “convert” to amateurism as Hammond did) in 1927 and Ewart Astill led Leicestershire as a professional for one season in 1935.
Therefore, in the ordinary course of affairs, Hammond, who for most of his career played as a professional (he played three games as an amateur immediately after leaving school in 1920 before signing a professional contract) had no chance of being appointed as England captain, even if he was by this time indisputably the best batter in the country. However, Hammond had social as well as cricketing ambitions. In his 1996 biography Wally Hammond: The Reasons Why, David Foot summarised the impression that Hammond gave his team-mates; he was always viewed as an overly ambitious social climber and an outright snob.
From his earliest days in the Gloucestershire team, Hammond had aspired to move up the social ladder and went to some trouble to “cultivate” influential amateurs. He preferred the company of the higher echelons of Bristol society to that of his working-class team-mates. According to Foot — in another of those passages where it is unclear how firmly rooted in historical fact we are — Pelham Warner suggested to him that he should find a job which enabled him to play as an amateur. Whether Warner would have been so open with a professional is perhaps doubtful.
Nevertheless, there were suggestions, as reported in the Daily Mirror in September 1928, that Hammond definitely planned to turn amateur. At the time, he was engaged to Dorothy Lister, whose father Joseph was a wealthy businessman. Perhaps Hammond hoped that Lister would support him financially, and the latter did not deny the truth of the rumours when questioned by the press. Yet following Hammond’s marriage in 1929, he continued to play as a professional. But his father-in-law’s wealth meant that he could afford to drive a car and wear fashionable clothes: in other words, to live an “amateur” lifestyle.
The Great Depression brought about the financial ruin of Lister, and meant that Hammond was unable to maintain such a lifestyle on the wages of a professional cricketer. In fact, he and Dorothy began to struggle, which cynics suggested as the explanation for why Hammond soon lost interest in a wife who no longer brought him financial benefit. At one point, Dorothy had to take a job, something which was still rare for married women. In 1933, Hammond was given a job as a sales promotion manager at the Cater Motor Company, a car manufacturer, for an annual salary of £1,000. The role was something of a sinecure and seemed to be more of a publicity stunt on the part of his employers than a substantial role. And as a salesman, he was not particularly effective. But it was a step in the right direction for Hammond’s social ambitions.
There were further rumours in August 1933 that Hammond would turn amateur if offered the England captaincy (as, according to the same story, Herbert Sutcliffe would have). The story appeared in an article written by “the Clubman” in the Daily Mirror (although the Gloucestershire Echo said that it was Lionel Tennyson who was the source).
And it seems that influential figures hoped to find Hammond a better-paying job which would allow him to do so. Foot suggests “a little coterie from the environs of Lord’s, headed by the unwaveringly loyal and effusive Warner, were busy sounding out people they knew in the City”, and that rumours were in full swing that Hammond planned to change his status. Even Gerald Howat, in his much drier 1984 biography of Hammond, hints at behind-the-scenes discussions: he suggests that business friends from Bristol, and his connections with men such as the Duke of Beaufort played a part. And he wrote how “influential members of the MCC” had approached Dunlop with a view to securing a directorship for Hammond to enable him to play as an amateur.
A photograph promoting Hammond’s appointment to the Board of Marsham Tyres
(Image: Wally Hammond: The Reasons Why (1996) by David Foot)
In the event, Hammond joined Marsham Tyres, a Bristol company, in November 1937. Advised by his business associates, he successfully held out for a place on the Board before accepting the role. His new job was widely reported in the press, as was the obvious follow-up that Gloucestershire had released him from his professional contract and that he would play as an amateur when the 1938 season began. Nevertheless, he dead-batted questions about whether he would be appointed England captain, even though it was clear to everyone what was going on.
Conveniently, this came at a time when the England captaincy was unsettled. After Bob Wyatt’s unsuccessful spell in charge, Gubby Allen led England against India in 1936 and against Australia during the 1936–37 Ashes, when England lost 3–2. Walter Robins led against New Zealand in 1937 but was not guaranteed a place in the Test team. Hammond had occasionally captained the Players against the Gentlemen, and had experience of leading Gloucestershire in the absence of the official amateur captain. Although he was generally considered to have done a sound job, he never stood out as an outstanding captain. His claims rested mainly on his status as the best batter in England.
Once Hammond entered the picture, most people therefore assumed that the role would be his. His only real rival was Gubby Allen; the latter made an effort to play regularly at the beginning of the 1938 season, something he did not always do. However, he was hampered by injury and when he was only made captain of “The Rest” during a Test trial at which Hammond was appointed as the captain of the England, he effectively sulked (although he claimed to be suffering from an injury) and pulled out of contention, not least because he was angry that Warner, the Chairman of Selectors, had not discussed it with him personally. Although he did not say so explicitly, E. W. Swanton was quite clear about what happened in his doting 1985 biography of Allen.
Therefore Hammond was named as captain for the 1938 series. He was the first former professional to captain England at home (although Jack Hobbs had taken charge mid-way through a Test during the 1926 Ashes when Arthur Carr was indisposed). The Establishment largely kept silent, although there were doubtless several eyebrows raised in private. Foot suggests that some critics were waiting to find fault with Hammond’s captaincy so they could blame his social status; he also records (without giving a source) one comment that “you couldn’t have a car salesman leading your country”, and another that Hammond “wouldn’t know which fork to use at the official banquets”.
Arguments were also rehashed about whether Hammond’s captaincy would be improved simply by his change of status. Hammond later betrayed some embarrassment at how the affair unfolded; Foot states that people who talked to him about the matter in later years got little out of him, and he “fidgeted without much comment”. In his own book, Secret History (1952), Hammond betrayed some confusion over his feelings towards amateur captaincy, suggesting both that it was illogical that he had been forced to turn amateur to captain England but also that all the best captains had been amateurs. But he later wrote that most amateurs did not understand the game in the same way that professionals did.
Unfortunately for Hammond, by the time he wrote those words, most critics had concluded that he did not understand the game either. By the time he left the role, a tired and disillusioned man, in 1947, his reputation as a captain had been ruined. But as with his batting, some distinction should be made between Hammond’s captaincy before the Second World War and after it. When he led England in Australia during the 1946–47 season, he was long past his best with the bat, rapidly became daunted by the scale of the task facing his underprepared team and was in the midst of intense personal strife as the failure of his marriage became public and the woman he intended to marry, Sybil Ness-Harvey, struggled to adapt to life in England while he was away. He was also palpably overweight, suffering from back problems and quite simply too old for the task. He came close to a breakdown and as such, was hardly in a fit state to captain. Although he should probably have retired beforehand, as long as he was available, he was the only realistic candidate to do the job. While the tour has its place in telling Hammond’s story, it should not in fairness form the basis of judgements on his ability as a captain.
Opinions on how he performed as captain before the war vary depending on how the person expressing them felt about Hammond. For example, E. W. Swanton wrote several disparaging pieces (mainly in later years) about him, but Swanton was extremely close to Gubby Allen. And even Swanton defended Hammond from criticism of his tactics during the 1939 series against the West Indies, in an article in The Cricketer that season. Charlie Barnett frequently tore Hammond’s captaincy apart in interviews, but the problems between the two men had far deeper roots than tactics.
Perhaps the fairest summary has been written by Alan Gibson in The Cricket Captains of England (1979) in which he observed: “[Hammond] won some praise for his captaincy before the war (not just conventional praise; [Jack] Fingleton, for instance, thought he was a good captain). After the war, he had some blame. Jim Swanton, in his later books, has been severe about him. I think it is fair to say that Hammond was not temperamentally well suited to the job.”
British Pathé footage of the first Test of the 1938 Ashes series, Hammond’s debut as captain
Hammond’s pre-war record was not too bad. He led England in three series in which he was undefeated: he drew 1–1 with Australia in 1938, defeated South Africa 1–0 in 1938–39 (on some horribly flat pitches) and won 1–0 against the West Indies in 1939. The latter two teams were stronger than they had been for most of the interwar period, and such results were not to be dismissed lightly. An overall record of three wins and one defeat from 13 Tests is very respectable. But even here, there were echoes of criticism.
Hammond’s biggest problem as captain was his inability to handle the different personalities within a team. Throughout his career, he had a reputation for being moody, difficult and unapproachable. He rarely gave advice or encouragement. In a team-mate, this was unfortunate but not disastrous; it was a source of regret rather than acrimony. But when he became captain, this was far more of an issue, particularly at Gloucestershire, where he replaced Basil Allen as captain for 1939. With England, he was surrounded by gifted players and, during home seasons, they were only around Hammond for a few days at a time. At Gloucestershire, a struggling county, he was with his team for six days each week. And many of his team-mates remembered his time as captain with considerable bitterness.
For example, A. H. Brodhurst, a Cambridge Blue who played for Gloucestershire in late 1939, was disconcerted when Hammond did not even speak to him as he was waiting nervously to bat in the middle of a collapse; nor did the captain offer any congratulations when he scored a fifty to rescue the team. George Lambert, Gloucestershire’s fast bowler, found Hammond difficult to play under. He told Foot how his captain would glare at him from slip if his line or length went awry, or if he conceded runs. Lambert also resented being over-bowled by Hammond, who would not allow him much chance to rest. He was heard to say several times: “What’s he got against me? When am I going to get a murmur of praise from him?” Barnett suggested in his own writing that Hammond was too curt and rude. Patrick Murphy, in his study of batters who scored a hundred first-class centuries, related how George Emmett once asked Hammond why he had been dropped from the team for a few games; the reply was: “Well, Emmett, you’re not a very good player, are you?”
And there are many more instances. Charlie Barnett suggested several times that Hammond would not accept advice from his team. F. R. Brown told Murphy that he thought Hammond was the worst captain under whom he had played: “He did everything by the clock, rotating bowlers at set stages.”
Not everyone was completely against him. The England wicket-keeper Les Ames had no complaints about his captaincy. Gloucestershire’s Reg Sinfield found him more approachable, and Hammond used to take him to inspect the pitch before the toss to ascertain his opinion over whether to bat or bowl. But even Sinfield’s reminiscences to Foot often ended with: “Such a great player — and such a bad captain.”
Perhaps part of the problem was that Hammond found captaincy difficult. He certainly felt the pressure as England’s pre-war captain; before Test matches, he went to stay with his friend and Gloucestershire team-mate William Neale to avoid the press, pacing up and down pondering selection problems and refusing to take phone calls. According to Foot, he also mentioned “feeling the strain” in one letter written before the war.
Wally Hammond, the England captain (right) tossing the coin with the Australian captain Don Bradman (left) at the Oval in 1938, watched by the groundsman “Bosser” Martin (centre)
If the consensus was that Hammond could not really inspire or motivate his players, what about his approach on the field? There were varied opinions on his tactical ability, but the 1938 series raised one or two questions. In the first Test, he pursued a very unusual strategy. England scored 658 for eight declared (and Hammond rebuked Denis Compton for getting out after scoring a two-hour century), leaving Australia simply looking to avoid defeat. They scored 411, batting for more than 130 overs before being asked to follow-on. And in all that time, Hedley Verity, a big threat to the Australians, bowled 7.3 overs. The explanation offered in Wisden was that “the probability that he would be in a position to enforce a follow-on influenced Hammond to conserve Verity’s energies”, but in his absence from the attack, Stan McCabe scored a brilliant 232; it was Verity who finally dismissed him after a tenth wicket partnership of 77 (Hammond attempted to keep McCabe off strike, to no avail). And had Hammond been braver, McCabe might have made far fewer runs. When the Australian batter came to the wicket, Sinfield, playing his only Test, asked Hammond for three short legs; Hammond eventually agreed on two, but early in his innings, McCabe put the ball in the air to where the third one would have been positioned.
Australia batted out the game after following on, scoring 427 for six in 184 overs, of which Verity delivered 62 overs. Perhaps such tactics did not affect the result on a very flat pitch, but it may not have inspired confidence. The inevitable Charlie Barnett, who played in the game, later told Alan Hill, for his 1986 biography of Verity, that this was “appalling captaincy”.
The second Test featured a Hammond double century, but he had little influence on the game tactically, apart from possibly instructing his later batters to hit out in the first innings. But a careless dismissal in the second innings — a one-handed shot to a ball pitched outside leg stump — put England in danger of defeat until the later batters salvaged the innings. There was one other incident which some observers called astute captaincy but which the watching Bob Wyatt attributed to luck. Doug Wright had taken an early wicket and when Don Bradman came in, beat the bat with three out of four deliveries. Hammond then removed Wright from the attack and brought on Verity; not long after, Bradman pulled a wide ball from Verity onto his stumps and was out for 18. Wyatt, who argued that on a flat pitch Wright’s wrist-spin was more likely to cause problems, later spoke to Bradman and said that he was surprised to see him get out in that fashion and that he had been equally surprised to see Wright taken off; Bradman responded that he was “very relieved”.
But with the third Test rained off, the crucial game was the fourth, played at Headingley. The match, played on a difficult pitch, was a low-scoring one. Australia took a 19-run first-innings lead and then bowled out England for 123; Hammond made a first-ball duck. Needing 105 to win, Australia struggled; several critics, including Neville Cardus, thought that spin was the answer, and Wright took three wickets. But Hammond persisted with his fast bowlers Ken Farnes and Bill Bowes, and Australia won by five wickets. Cardus wrote: “Hammond’s faith in fast bowling rather exceeded his faith in the arts of Verity and Wright. The result was sad disillusionment.” Again, Barnett had plenty to say about this to Alan Hill; he said that Verity wanted to bowl over the wicket to aim at a patch of rough on leg stump but Hammond would not allow it. He argued that Hammond should have used Bowes at one end to dry up runs and allowed Verity to attack from the other. Bowes himself spoke of the matter over the winter, suggesting that Yorkshire would have adopted this approach; some newspapers interpreted this as a criticism of Hammond, prompting Bowes to instruct his solicitors to request an apology and to write a hasty letter to Hammond explaining what happened.
The final Test, at the Oval, was the game in which England scored 903 for seven and Len Hutton scored 364. Hammond had little to do as captain, but as the game was a timeless one (played to a finish however long it took), instructed his batters to take no risks. When Hutton, having reached three figures, began to hit out at one stage, Hammond gestured for him to continue playing safely. Aiming for a total in four figures, Hammond only declared after it became clear that Bradman would be unable to bat, having badly injured his ankle when bowling. England levelled the series, winning by an extraordinary margin of an innings and 579 runs, although Australia had retained the Ashes.
One other unusual achievement that summer was that when Hammond captained the Gentlemen against the Players, he became the only man to lead both teams in the fixture.
In the aftermath of a relatively successful season, Hammond’s captaincy was praised. In his notes for the 1939 edition, the Wisden editor Wilfrid Brookes wrote: “Hammond last summer showed unmistakably that he was well fitted for the post; indeed, having regard to his limited experience of leading an eleven before he took charge of the England side in all the Test Matches, he surprised his closest friends by his intelligent tactics. Undoubtedly Hammond proved himself a sagacious and inspiring captain.” This hardly suggests that Hammond did quite as bad a job as others subsequently argued.
Less has been written about Hammond’s captaincy in South Africa. This was the first time that England had sent a full-strength Test team for a series there, a reaction to South Africa’s 1–0 win in England in 1935. Usually, teams to South Africa were experimental, or rewards for long-serving professionals who would not otherwise have played Test cricket. But the 1938–39 team contained all the leading players. Even so, there was far less pressure than experienced during an Ashes series.
Les Ames told Foot that Hammond had captained “beautifully” in South Africa: “I spent a lot of time with the Kent amateur Bryan Valentine, on that tour. We found ourselves discussing Wally a great deal. And we couldn’t find any serious faults at all.” One anonymous member of the team told Howat that Hammond had on one occasion stepped between two bowlers, one from each team, and prevented an argument spiralling out of hand. And Bill Edrich, whom Hammond had persisted in selecting despite his complete failure in every Test until he repaid his faith with an innings of 219 in the final Test, said: “He was the perfect leader, perceptive and astute on the field and an ambassador of the highest order off it.” The South African captain Alan Melville thought he did a good job too, telling Howat: “[The fielders] kept their eyes on him and responded to slight indications by eye or finger.” South African journalists were generally complimentary. E. W. Swanton, writing for the Illustrated London News at the time said that he had been a “sagacious tactician”; however, in later years he was more critical retrospectively, saying that Hammond’s captaincy on that tour had made him “apprehensive” about how he would handle an Australian tour, largely because of his moods and frequent silences.
There was less scope for Hammond to display his tactical skills in a light-hearted and fast-scoring series against the West Indies in 1939. But his captaincy of Gloucestershire was praised in Wisden for his “enterprising cricket and a spirit of adventure”.
Wally Hammond in 1946
Had Hammond stopped there, he may have retired with a good reputation as captain. Maybe not one of the best, but a respectable captain of England. But he continued, perhaps out of loyalty, perhaps out of desire to prove himself and beat Australia. His captaincy of Gloucestershire in 1946 was mixed: the team began well before running out of steam, and he missed several matches with back problems. This may have warned what was coming, but he continued as England captain: against India in 1946 (England won 1–0) and then for the ill-fated tour of Australia in 1946–47.
The tour was a terrible failure for Hammond. He proved a moody, unapproachable and uninspiring captain. He was distant from the players, travelling separately to games, and gave little useful advice when they were struggling. Even Wisden said of the 1946–47 Australian tour that he “was not the same inspiring leader as at home against Australia in 1938”. Criticised for his tactics by the press, he increasingly retreated into his shell. Part of the problem might have been the contrasting attitude between Hammond — who saw the tour as a goodwill gesture after the war and to be played on friendly terms — and his opposite number Bradman, who wanted to crush the opposition. This difference was made clear when Bradman was given not out after apparently edging to slip in the first Test, drawing an audible complaint from Hammond that it was a “fine fucking way to start a series” (although some versions suggest a “fine bloody way”). After that, relations between the teams deteriorated, Hammond became more and more withdrawn and defeated, not least as he could no longer bat in his old manner. And it was notable — as pointed out in Wisden — that when Hammond missed the final Test with ill-health, England played better under his vice-captain Norman Yardley, whose field-placing and tactics seemed better than Hammond’s. Even so, England still lost; realistically, an outmatched team had little chance against one of the greatest Australian teams to take the field.
But Hammond was universally judged to have made matters worse. Attacks came from everywhere. Brian Sellers, the Yorkshire captain who covered the tour as a journalist, was extremely critical of Hammond’s field-placing. Within the team, Denis Compton resented him and Paul Gibb felt that his presence in the team had a negative impact on him personally, as revealed in his tour diaries. It was, in every respect, an utter disaster and coloured all retrospective judgements of Hammond’s captaincy.
But perhaps it is unfair to use this tour as a way to judge Hammond as a captain any more than it would be fair to use it to assess his batting. He was not a great captain. But nor was he as terrible as history suggests.
The rest of Hammond’s life was a sad anti-climax. He moved to South Africa where he joined another car business, which later folded, and was forgotten, despite his long career and amazing batting record. That final tour cast a long and embarrassing shadow. His family — he and Sybil had three children — faced serious financial problems, and he took a job as a sports administrator at University of Natal. A serious car crash almost killed him 1960, and he never really recovered, dying of a heart attack in 1965.